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Making The Real: Rhetorical Adduction and the Bangladesh Liberation War 
Joseph O’Mahoney 
 
Abstract 
Do normative arguments change what political actors do? If so, how? Rather than the pure force 
of abstract moral reasoning, states often try to move the locus of contestation to an arena in 
which they can make practical progress - the evidence, or the empirical facts in support of their 
argument. This paper analyzes the way states try to bolster their position first by constructing an 
argument in which an action represents part of their argument and then, second, by performing 
that action to make the argument seem more convincing. This mechanism I call rhetorical 
adduction. The paper challenges theories of communication that deny a causal role to the content 
of normative arguments and diverges from a leading view in the literature on argumentation that 
arguments have their effects through persuasion. The paper integrates strategic argumentation 
theory with theory from psychology of how people make choices based on compelling reasons 
rather than cost-benefit analysis, as well as theory from sociology of how people resolve morally 
complex situations through the performance of ‘reality tests’.  I illustrate the mechanism using a 
case from the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.  Initial resistance to recognizing the putative state of 
Bangladesh after India's invasion of East Pakistan was reversed due to an argument that Indian 
troop withdrawal meant that international norms were not violated.   
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In 1971, India invaded Pakistan and used the ensuing military victory to create a new state out of 
a large chunk of Pakistani territory.  India’s actions were widely criticized.  For example, 
speaking to the UN Security Council, US Ambassador to the UN George Bush described the 
invasion as “force in violation of the United Nations Charter”1 and speaking to the press on 
behalf of the US government he called it “aggression” against Pakistan.2  A UN General 
Assembly resolution taking an anti-India position was passed overwhelmingly, 104 to 11.3  India, 
and others including the USSR, counterargued, claiming that India’s use of force was a 
humanitarian intervention.  Recognition of the proposed new state, called Bangladesh, was 
initially opposed and resisted, with reasons including that it would violate international law, that 
such recognition would “guarantee the fruits of aggression”,4 and that the new state did not 
command enough loyalty.  A request to invite representatives of Bangladesh to the Security 
Council was denied because a new state with the necessary criteria for recognition did not exist.5  
Two proposed Security Council resolutions rejecting the transfer of political authority to 
Bangladesh were only defeated by a Soviet veto.  Soviet-drafted resolutions including 
“recognition [of] the will of the East Pakistan population, as expressed, clearly and definitely, 
in …elections” were rejected.6  However, despite this initial widespread condemnation, several 
months after the Indian invasion, dozens of states recognized Bangladesh and accepted it as a 
                                                     
1 S/PV.1606, 194.  Note: S/PV refers to the United Nations Security Council Official Record.  Referenced with 
meeting and paragraph number.   
2  New York Times, 9 December 1971, 17.   
3  With 10 abstentions: GA/RES/2793 XXVI. 
4  S/PV.1608, 104 
5  S/PV. 1613, 93, 134. 
6  S/PV. 1608, 52 
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new member of the international community.  How did states reconcile this contradiction?  Why 
did states that initially firmly rejected giving authority to a new state in East Pakistan turnaround 
and recognize Bangladesh?   
This puzzle is just one instance of international actors arguing over their actions and policies and 
those of their opponents.  States often disagree about a policy that requires the consent or 
participation of the rest of the international community and so try to win over the undecided.  As 
well as bribery and coercive threats, states try to make the policy seem useful, good, or 
legitimate.7  That is, they make normative arguments.  Their goal is to make arguments that are 
as convincing as possible.8  Of course, at the same time, the opposing group of states is 
attempting the same thing.  Arguments are met with counterarguments.  But do such arguments 
have any influence on the overall outcome?  Normative argumentation can be powerful but only 
if your version wins out over the opponents’.  But what makes one argument better than another?   
This paper answers this question with reference to a particular type of way that states try to win 
normative arguments.  Rather than the pure force of abstract moral reasoning, states try to move 
the locus of contestation to an arena in which they can make practical progress – the evidence, or 
the empirical facts in support of their argument.  It is not given by nature what facts are relevant 
to normative arguments and so there are two things states can do that might allow them to 
                                                     
7  This is the basis of the argumentation and rhetorical action literatures.  See e.g. Risse 2000; Schimmelfennig 2001; 
Krebs and Jackson 2007; Bjola and Kornprobst 2011. 
8  What makes an argument convincing may not conform to an abstract definition of rationality.  See e.g. Kuhn 1991 
for evidence that people change their minds on formally fallacious grounds, like the provision of a single example, 
mere elaboration of a possible causal pathway, or even pointing out the negative effects of a behavior as proof that it 
does not occur. 
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manipulate an audience’s attitude towards a policy.  First, states can reach into the 
intersubjective collection of ideas, symbols, and rhetorical commonplaces9 and link together 
some empirical fact and some part of their normative argument.  In particular, they might be able 
to define the empirical fact such that it is the result of, or constituted by, an action that they can 
take.  Second, they can take action to change the empirical situation so that it is congruent with 
their argument.  Standard stories of manipulation include lying,10 deception,11 and costly 
signaling,12 but these are not the only ways of understanding what states can do.  In particular, if 
you can remove or dilute objections to a policy by changing the normative status of that policy, 
then people will be less likely to oppose and more likely to support your preferred policy.  One 
important influence on the acceptability of a normative argument is the extent to which the facts 
conform to the premises (explicit or implicit) of the argument.  A central problem in international 
politics is, then, “How can you make your version of reality seem more real than your 
opponents?” 
In this paper, I analyze the way states try to bolster their position first by constructing an 
argument in which a particular action represents or manifests part of the argument, and then, 
second, by performing that action to make the argument seem more convincing.  This process I 
call rhetorical adduction.13   
                                                     
9 Crawford 2002; Krebs and Jackson 2007.  
10 Mearsheimer 2010 
11 Reiter 2012 
12 Fearon 1997 
13 Adduction is an act of adducing and to adduce something is to offer, cite, or provide it as evidence in support of 
an argument.   
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The paper challenges IR theories of communication that deny a causal role to the content of 
normative arguments.  It also diverges from a leading view in the literature on argumentation and 
rhetorical action on how arguments have their effects and instead builds an alternative 
framework that integrates strategic argumentation theory from IR with theory from psychology 
of how people make choices based on compelling reasons rather than cost-benefit analysis, as 
well as theory from sociology of how people resolve morally complex situations through the 
performance of ‘reality tests’.   
First, I review the literature on the role of communication in IR and in particular on how 
arguments are theorized to have effects on action, and then focus in on the debate over why some 
arguments are better than others.  Next, I specify the form of the rhetorical adduction mechanism.  
In order to illustrate how rhetorical adduction works, I then explore the operation of the 
mechanism in a particularly important aspect of world politics; territorial integrity disputes.  
Specifically, I investigate the peacemaking process after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, or the 
Bangladesh Liberation War.  I argue that the recognition of the new state of Bangladesh and the 
withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladeshi territory were both driven by rhetorical adduction.  
States were not already inclined to recognize Bangladesh because of the intense political 
violence in East Pakistan, and recognition decisions were not uncontested and regularized 
applications of international law.  Further, India’s withdrawal was not a result of high occupation 
costs (or the expectation thereof) or other Bangladeshi resistance.  Instead, recognition was made 
possible by the argument that the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh meant that 
recognizing Bangladesh would not violate norms of non-aggression, self-determination, or the 
international legal norm of effective control of territory, and withdrawal was aimed at bolstering 
that argument.   
9 
 
How Do Arguments Have Their Effects? 
The current literature on the role of argumentation can be divided into three parts according to 
the types of effects they allow arguments to have. 14  The leading two approaches are based on a 
model of action in which actors have a set of preferences (complete and transitive).  Rationalist 
models do not allow for arguments to change preferences (although they might reveal 
information that would change beliefs).15  Persuasionists allow for arguments to be causal, but 
believe that the only causally-relevant effect that arguments have is to change preferences.  
Finnemore and Sikkink define persuasion as the effective attempt by advocates to “change the 
utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitment.”16  Once changed, 
preferences interact with beliefs to produce action different from what would have happened 
without the argument.  An influential example of persuasionism is Risse’s seminal account of the 
“logic of arguing”, a third alternative to strategic, utility-maximizing, action and rule-guided 
behavior.  This involved actors engaging in “truth seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual 
understanding based on a reasoned consensus”.17  However, Risse’s account has several 
limitations.  First, it cannot easily deal with rhetorical action, or the strategic use of 
argumentation and discourse.  Following Habermas, Risse sees action as either strategic, in that 
preferences are fully defined and fixed and completely immune to any talk, or as arguing, where 
                                                     
14  In this review I focus in on only this one element of the literature.  See Seymour 2014 for an alternative, more 
comprehensive, breakdown of the argumentation literature.  An important point that I do not cover here is the 
distinction between an argument’s effect on action and its effect on the background collection of ideas, symbols, and 
rhetorical commonplaces. 
15  For just one example addressing this particular point, see Goldsmith and Posner 2002.   
16 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 914 
17 Risse 2000, 1.  See also Deitelhoff 2009 
10 
 
actors are willing to change their previous preferences because of the logical power of an 
argument.  The contrast is between doing something because a more powerful actor coerces you 
to, and because you newly believe that this is the right thing to do.  As Schimmelfennig and 
Mueller point out, however, this distinction is untenable, because rhetorical action is both 
strategic and concerned with argumentation.18  How can these be reconciled?  One way that stays 
within Risse’s framework is that rhetorical action can enlist both sincere agreement and also 
insincere acquiescence.  Some actors who are under social pressure may not change their deeply 
held normative beliefs, or feel ashamed, but instead refrain from behavior intersubjectively 
constructed as illegitimate to the extent that they are concerned about their standing and 
reputation in the community.  They might also want to leverage their reputation in later rhetorical 
contestation.  The potential social fallout from rejecting what you think seems to other people a 
reasonable argument could have constraining or motivating effects.19   
For Risse, the crucial distinction between rhetorical and communicative action is whether the 
arguers are willing to change their minds or be persuaded.20  This he defines in terms of changing 
“interests” or “views of the world” due to the better argument where considerations of power and 
hierarchy are absent.  However, the second limitation of a standard persuasionist account is that 
this ignores the numerous ways that people’s attitudes can be influenced through ‘irrational’ 
means.  Risse himself uses several examples as instances of communicative action that undercut 
his definition.  One is that actors with “authoritative knowledge or moral authority” will be more 
                                                     
18 Schimmelfennig 2001, 65; Mueller 2004, 414 
19 Hanrieder 2011, 392 
20 He defines arguing as a situation in which all speakers are open to be persuaded by the better argument (Risse 
2004, 294).   
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convincing to an audience than actors with known private interests.21  If this is true, it is not due 
to a logical property of the better argument.  The non-logical element to the superior 
convincingness of an argument is an example of a whole class of influences on argumentation 
that is absent from Risse's schema.  An alternative strand of the argumentation literature,22 as 
well as the strategic framing literature23 allows for a variety of effects of discourse.   
The third problem with a persuasionist account is the implicitly binary nature of the effect of 
argumentation.  At time 𝑡1, A prefers x over y.  Then argumentation occurs.  Finally, at time 𝑡2, 
A prefers y over x.  This kind of attitude change is only one possible effect of argumentation.  
However, various other possible effects have been identified.  For example, Benford and Snow 
identify three framing-tasks; diagnostic framing for the identification of a problem and 
assignment of blame, prognostic framing to suggest solutions to a problem or strategies to pursue, 
and motivational framing that provides a rationale or call to action.24  A particular type of effect 
is that argumentation can change the normative status of an action .  Actors vary in how much 
they care about normative statuses as well as any particular normative status.  Normative status is 
not necessarily binary, such as good or bad.  Instead, an act can vary from despicable through 
distasteful, to neutral, and then to admirable and heroic.  It can also range from forbidden, 
through frowned upon and excused to permitted, and then to obligatory.  Pushing in line has a 
different normative status from murder, though both are norm violations.  Another important 
type of normative status is the difference between a clear violation and an excused exception, for 
                                                     
21  Risse 2000, 22 
22  E.g. Krebs and Jackson 2007; Bjola and Kornprobst 2011; Seymour 2014. 
23  e.g. Sell and Prakash 2004; Busby 2007 
24  Benford and Snow 2000, 615. 
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example murder and killing in self-defense.  When an act appears to potentially represent a norm 
violation, actors attempt to justify it, both to themselves and to outside audiences.  As Shannon 
explains, this difference often hinges on “one's ability to define a situation in a way that allows 
socially accepted violation.”25   
Fourthly, persuasionism follows rationalism in assuming what Slovic calls “stable, well-
articulated preferences”,26 that is, clearly defined prior preferences over outcomes (i.e. 
completeness of preferences).  Sometimes, people do have preferences that are clear and do not 
change over time.  In such cases, argumentation and framing will probably have relatively little 
effect.  However, in other situations, people do not have complete preferences over outcomes.  
For example, they might have conflicting values, like the tradeoff between the cheapest, the most 
convenient, and the best quality option, making an overall valuation impossible.  Also, their 
preferences may be different over time, even very short intervals.  One set of findings from 
psychology is that preferences “are frequently constructed in the moment and are susceptible to 
fleeting situational factors”.27  The extent to which preferences in general are stable and 
complete is an area of ongoing research, but in any particular situation, the less clearly formed 
and immutable preferences are, the more likely it is that argumentation has a causal effect on 
action.   
Reason-based Choice 
                                                     
25 Shannon 2000, 300 
26 Slovic 1995 
27 Ariely and Norton 2008, 13. For accounts of psychological research in IR, see Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001 and 
Shannon and Kowert 2011. 
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What is the nature of this causal effect if it is not changing the preferences of actors from x>y to 
y>x?  A prominent alternative to a value-based model of action (like expected utility theory or 
prospect theory) is reason-based choice.28  A value-based model specifies how much an actor 
values the alternatives along a single dimension, like utility.  This type of model explains a 
choice with reference to its having the highest value.29  By contrast, a reason-based choice 
analysis identifies a variety of reasons for and against the various alternatives and explains a 
choice with reference to the balance of those reasons.  People choose an alternative because they 
can provide “a compelling argument for choice that can be used to justify the decision to oneself 
as well as to others”.30  
Reason-based choice accords far more strongly with our intuitive ideas about how we reason and 
make choices.  When we normally think and talk about making choices, we consider and present 
reasons why an option would be better as well as reasons why an option would be worse.  This 
idea is prominent in the international law literature as well as being present in IR.31  Also, the 
fact that individuals can be conflicted in decision making is more consistent with conflicting 
reasons being hard to reconcile than it is with actors having clear ideas about their ordering of 
the options.   
Further, many empirically established violations of features of rationality can be easily 
accommodated in a reason-based framework.  One such feature is procedure invariance, or the 
                                                     
28 Shafir et al 1993; McDermott 2001, 18-26 
29 An emerging trend in cognitive science is towards ‘comparison-only’ findings where the brain does not calculate 
value at all.  For a review see Vlaev et al 2011. 
30 Tversky et al 1988, 372 
31 See Johnstone 2003 for a statement of the role ‘justificatory discourses’ play in international law.   
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idea that preferences over options are independent of the method used to elicit them.  Shafir et al 
point out that notable features provide compelling reasons for the decision; “reasons for choosing 
are more compelling when we choose than when we reject, and reasons for rejecting matter more 
when we reject than when we choose”.32   
Other violations of rationality that can be accommodated in a reason-based choice framework are 
the sunk-cost fallacy, preference inversion, framing effects, loss aversion, the endowment effect, 
status-quo bias, attribute balance, feature creep, and the disjunction effect among others.33  The 
importance of reasons for decision making is increased when the decision maker has to justify a 
decision to others.34  Such situations are rife in international politics.  The inability of standard 
rational choice theory to account for the role of reasons in decision making has prompted 
attempts at formalizing preference formation and change in terms of the basket of reasons that 
are motivationally salient.35  
A reason-based choice model of action can provide a way for rhetorical argumentation to be 
causally relevant with respect to choice of action.  If actors do not have complete, stable 
preferences over the options presented, an argument can “highlight different aspects of the 
options and bring forth different reasons and considerations that influence decision”.36  In choice 
situations where either preferences are nonexistent or inchoate, or no option dominates (i.e. each 
                                                     
32 Shafir et al 1993, 18 
33 For a review see Mercier and Sperber 2011, 70-1 
34 Simonson 1989 
35 Dietrich and List 2011, Dietrich and List 2013 
36 Shafir et al 1993, 34 
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option is highest on at least one attribute), an argument could provide a hitherto nonsalient 
reason for or against an option.   
This shows that it is not necessary for anyone to “change their mind” for rhetorical arguments to 
have a causal effect on action.  Actors can engage in strategic rhetorical action while also being 
involuntarily susceptible to the, sometimes subconscious, effects of argumentation.  One type of 
effect can be to change the normative status of an action or situation.   
Rhetorical action matters more when there is a third-party audience who are undecided or whose 
conception of the meaning of a situation is not fixed, or whose support is up for grabs in some 
way.  Krebs and Jackson have elaborated a general model of rhetorical action that incorporates 
the role of this audience.37  In this model, two actors are arguing over a policy and a third actor, 
the audience, is crucial to the success of this policy.  The two arguers (the claimant and the 
opposition) engage in rhetorical contestation to win over the audience.  Whichever actor is more 
successful in this rhetorical contestation is rewarded with more or less support or resistance for 
the policy in question.  Rhetorical coercion occurs when one actor is forced to stop arguing 
against or even to advocate for a policy.  Rhetorical coercion is possible because actors need to 
justify their behavior to each other and because these justifications are constrained (e.g. by the 
limits of intersubjectively shared discourse).   
Say there is a policy p which has a set of reasons in favor and also a set of reasons against or 
objections 𝑜1, 𝑜2, … , 𝑜𝑛, such that the audience does not have a clear stable preference over 
whether the policy is enacted or not.  If the audience finds a potential objection 𝑜𝑖 compelling in 
                                                     
37 Krebs and Jackson 2007. 
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some way, the audience resists the action.38  Argumentation can be used to remove an objection 
by altering the normative status of the policy.  A common example of removing an objection is 
by changing the normative status from a clear violation of a norm to an excused exception to the 
norm.  The argument is then causally relevant to the action in the case that the action would not 
have occurred in the face of resistance by the audience, ceteris paribus.  Here, removing an 
objection does not mean that policies of the same type as p are forever believed to be morally 
right by everyone.  All that it means is that resistance to policy p is reduced or eliminated in this 
particular case.  This conception of the effect of argumentation allows that an argument can be 
successful at removing an objection and yet have no impact on behavior because the balance of 
reasons is still heavily one-sided.  The recognition of Bangladesh is an especially good case to 
observe the effect of argumentation on behavior because the reasons for and against were 
relatively evenly balanced.   
As Kornprobst notes, there can be different levels of support for, or a lack of resistance to, a 
policy.  He identifies acquiescence, compromise, and consensus.39  Acquiescence is the weakest; 
people simply acquiesce with a dominant argument but they are not convinced.  Compromise 
involves people who are not convinced but actively agree to mutual concessions as long as they 
do not violate their deepest-held beliefs.  Consensus, the strongest, is when actors both publicly 
agree with and internally believe in the policy.  These are differing levels of support for a policy.  
Resistance to a policy similarly varies.  People could simply refuse to support the policy, 
effectively doing nothing.  They could grudgingly adopt the policy while still challenging its 
justification.  They might both reject the policy and argue against it.  At the extreme, they could 
                                                     
38 See below for a discussion of differing levels of resistance to action. 
39 Kornprobst 2014, 197 
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reject the policy and actively take steps to try and reverse it.  When a policy’s success is 
dependent upon the attitudes and actions of an audience group of states, altering the level of 
support or resistance to that policy is an important goal of both the claimant and opposition 
groups.40   
What Makes For a Better Argument? 
If argumentation can have these effects, what is it that determines which arguments are 
successful and which fail?  The existing literature has some suggestions.  For Krebs and Jackson, 
as in many accounts of rhetorical action (and framing and securitization41), the public’s, or 
audience’s, acceptance or rejection of the framing or implications of the arguments deployed by 
a claimant is central.  The audience serves as the adjudicator of the “better argument”.42  Krebs 
and Jackson largely bracket the question of why a public finds an argument acceptable.  But it 
seems reasonable that there are multiple influences on a public’s acceptance or rejection of an 
argument.  One of these influences, they posit, is the limits on creating or formulating the basic 
building blocks of argumentation, rhetorical commonplaces; “they are not free to deploy utterly 
alien formulations in the course of contestation; such arguments would fall… on deaf ears.”43  
This is not the only conceivable limitation.  Some writers have looked to features of the 
                                                     
40 In the same way that inquiring into the genesis of actor preferences is a separate endeavor in rationalist analyses, 
the source of an audience’s “willingness to accept” is a separate research task from analyzing effects on 
argumentation and behavior.   
41 Watson 2012, 284-5 
42 See also Ulbert and Risse 2005, 353 
43 Krebs and Jackson 2007, 45 
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normative ideas themselves,44 or to a comparison with some sort of ideal to try and explain why 
audiences find some arguments more acceptable than others.  For example, Elster posits that the 
appearance of impartiality and consistency is a crucial factor, going so far as to appeal to a 
“civilizing force of hypocrisy”.45   
A seemingly obvious factor is the role of evidence.  The argument of this paper relies upon the 
idea that empirical evidence supporting an argument makes that argument more convincing.  
This seems uncontroversial46 and is the foundation of the rationalist literature on communication.  
For rationalists, effective communication takes the form of costly signaling47 or cheap talk48 and 
is evaluated on those terms.  However, even though these are important and useful ideas, they are 
at best incomplete.  Even costly signals require interpretation.  For example, whether a costly 
signal can change beliefs requires that “there is objective and uncontestable knowledge, shared 
among sender and receiver, about what costs mean to either”.49  Jervis makes the point that: 
“Actions are not automatically less ambiguous than words.  Indeed, without an accompanying 
message, it may be impossible for the perceiving actor to determine what image the other is 
trying to project.”50  Further, with many political phenomena, communication is complicated by 
the ubiquity of essentially contested concepts.  An issue with some existing work is the stark 
                                                     
44 e.g. Risse et al 1999 suggest that norms dealing with physical injury are more appealing than other types of norms.   
45 Elster 1998 
46 Nyhan and Reifler, 2010, would disagree as they find that, for the politically engaged, evidence correcting a 
misperception actually increases the misperception rather than overturning it. 
47 e.g. Schelling 1960; Fearon 1997 
48 e.g. Sartori 2005 
49 Mueller 2004, 398 
50 Jervis 1971, 19 
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distinction usually drawn between “signaling facts” and “entering a moral discourse”.51  While it 
is reasonable to draw this distinction in the abstract, people in practice often experience moral 
discourse as an indistinguishable part of empirical discourse.  In particular, people often see 
moral judgments as resting definitively on empirical facts.  However, despite their importance to 
decision-making, it is not clear what the empirical referent of concepts like “democracy”, 
“corruption”, “genocide”, “terrorism”, or “aggression” are.52  Further, social norms, rules, and 
institutions have an “open texture” in the sense that they refer to classes of persons and classes of 
acts, things and circumstances and as such it is uncertain whether and how they apply “in 
particular concrete cases”.53  In order to come to a judgment on whether an action or actor has a 
property, like that of being-democratic, or being-genocide, or being-the-product-of-self-
determination, people use shorthand indicators.  As Hanrieder points out,54 morally complex 
situations are resolved through the performance of “critical tests” which rely on some 
performance, including actions or reference to symbols.  Boltanski and Thevenot note that 
normative reasoning does not often take the ideal form represented in philosophy journals in 
which reasoning over the empirical situation and the normative situation are kept strictly separate.  
Instead, in practice people resolve contests over normative concepts (like the legitimacy of an 
action or whether an act or a situation is an instance of a norm) by pointing to particular 
empirical facts as determinative of normative conclusions.  In conditions of ambiguity and 
                                                     
51 for example, Mueller 2004, 400 
52  We could go further and say that there is no truth of the matter, except in terms of what humans do in practice 
treat as instances of these concepts (Searle 2010).   
53 Hart 1994, 123-4 
54 Hanrieder 2011 
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uncertainty, such as a contestation over legitimacy, people rely on “reality tests”55 in which 
judgments about the fluid and plastic social world rest on “the factual nature of the elements that 
have been invoked”.56  For example, when reacting to a police officer’s killing of a suspect, 
people might rest their moral judgment solely on whether the suspect was armed or unarmed, or 
who shot first, despite this only being one small part of the possible complex normative 
argumentation we could build around this question.  Similarly, Mor mentions how important the 
“provision of some new facts (selected and presented with a certain interpretation in mind)” is 
for the process of legitimation and counter-legitimation that affects external support for an 
actor’s position.57  In the framing literature, “empirical credibility”58 is a constraint on framing 
events.  The issue is not whether “claims are factual or valid, but whether their empirical 
referents lend themselves to being perceived as ‘real’ indicators of the diagnostic claims.”59  
So, a normative argument can be better if it makes a normative label more convincing through 
referring to some fact about the situation.  But what facts are relevant or influential?  Actors are 
not able to say anything they like and have an audience accept their formulation.  If there are 
rules governing the type of situation, those rules specify relevant facts.  But even when rules are 
                                                     
55 Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, 367 
56 Boltanski and Thevenot 2006, 133.  The term “facts” here refers to claims about the world that are relatively 
objective, such as existential claims about physical objects, as opposed to interpretations of those facts.  For example, 
the concept of permission is crucial to whether some action is treated as theft, trespassing, a violation of sovereignty, 
sexual assault, and so on.  Whether someone is judged to have permission often depends on reference to a particular 
empirical fact, like whether a piece of paper has been signed or whether a sign was displayed.   
57 Mor 2012, 407.   
58 Benford and Snow 2000.  See also Snow et al 1986. 
59 Benford 2011, 72 
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precise and comprehensive, there is inevitably a judgment made on whether a particular case 
counts as an instance of the general categories referred to in the rules.  Those judgments are 
made with reference to an intersubjectively-defined collection of characteristics.  What matters is 
not the truth of the matter but the socially defined markers of what counts.  This idea is related to 
the concept of a “practice” or a competent performance of a socially recognized pattern of 
behavior,60 and is linked to the theme in the argumentation literature that arguments have to be 
anchored in something that is widely taken-for-granted, or rhetorical commonplaces, in order for 
them to make sense and be convincing.61  One example comes from the procedure for obtaining 
US resident alien status via spousal application (a “green card”).  A vital element is whether the 
relationship between the petitioner and spouse conforms to the practice of a “bona fide marriage” 
according to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, including whether there are 
any “Discrepancies in statements on questions for which a husband and wife should have 
common knowledge”.62  A competent performance of a “bona fide marriage” here relies upon 
conforming to a set of socially-defined or intersubjective characteristics.   
To summarize, contra rationalist or persuasionist claims, arguments can have effects by 
providing reasons for or against a policy, especially when the support of a third-party audience is 
up for grabs.  These effects include changing the normative status of an action, such as from a 
norm violation to an excused exception.  Normative arguments can be made more convincing 
                                                     
60 Adler and Pouliot 2011 
61 Crawford 2002; Krebs and Jackson 2007. 
62 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Adjudicator’s Field Manual, Chapter 21.3 section (a) 
paragraph (2) Adjudication Issues, subparagraph (h) Interviewing petitioner and spouse, 
<http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1.html> 
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when they are anchored in empirical evidence, such as the actions of the parties, but this 
evidence is only effective when it is rhetorically linked to the argument.  If an action conforms to 
some intersubjectively defined criteria, i.e. is a competent performance, it is more likely to be 
accepted.  These ideas together suggest a mechanism whereby actors can use actions to bolster 
normative arguments.  I call this mechanism “rhetorical adduction”. 
Rhetorical Adduction 
Rhetorical adduction is the process by which states try to raise support for their position first by 
constructing an argument in which a particular action represents part of an argument, and then, 
second, by performing that action to make the argument seem more convincing.  Here I lay out a 
schematic account of the process.  See Figure 1 for a representation of the process. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Two groups of states have a dispute over a policy whose success depends in some way on the 
actions of a third group of states uncommitted or undecided about the policy.  For simplicity, the 
policy could take one of two values; it could either be enacted or not.  The group of states that 
wants the policy enacted is denoted C, the claimant.  The group of states that does not want the 
policy enacted is denoted O, the opposition.  The undecided group of states is denoted P, the 
public or audience, which can either resist or support the policy (or at least acquiesce in its 
enactment).  O makes an argument.  This argument raises an objection to the policy that involves 
a claim that the policy is illegitimate because it has property X.  C then makes a counterargument, 
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in which C claims that the policy does not have property X and that instead the policy has 
property Y, which means that it is not illegitimate. Further, the counterargument specifies some 
action, A, that demonstrates that the policy has property Y.  C then performs action A.  P then 
supports the policy.   
What does rhetorical adduction consist of in this process?  First, the counterargument that the 
policy has a property that means it is not illegitimate, including the claim that a particular action 
means that the policy has that property (the ‘rhetorical’ part).  The second part of rhetorical 
adduction is actually performing that action as ‘proof’ that the policy has the property (the 
‘adduction’ part).   
At several points in this process, it may get derailed.  O may not, or may not be able to, make an 
argument.  C may not, or may not be able to, concoct a counterargument that makes sense.  C 
may then not be able to perform the action.  Even if it is performed, it may not be convincing to 
the audience, which may then decide not to support the policy.   
An ideal-type of the underlying structure of the argumentation involved in rhetorical adduction is 
the following:63    
1) Policy p has property X.   
2) If a policy has property X, it is illegitimate.  
                                                     
63 Despite this ideal-typical representation, in practice people often do not conform to formal logical rules.  Toulmin 
2005 identifies parts of argument that people do in fact use and defines warrants or “inference-licenses” that 
authorize a move from data to claim, and backing, which serves to support or justify the warrants.  Rhetorical 
adduction includes the provision of warrants in that it involves linking some proposed data with a claim about the 
policy at issue, and the provision of backing for those warrants through performing an action that supports the 
warrant.   
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2*) Thus, p is illegitimate. 
The argument being made by O, the opposition to the policy at stake, is that because policy p has 
property X, it is illegitimate (1,2, → 2*).  
3) A policy cannot have both property X and property Y.   
4) Policy p has property Y.  
5) Thus, policy p does not have property X.   
5*) Thus, policy p does not have property Y. 
6) Thus, 2* is false.  
The counterargument being made by the claimant C is that the policy has property Y and that, 
because a policy cannot have both X and Y, the policy does not have X and thus is not 
illegitimate (3, 4, → 5, → 6).  Crucially, the audience has to resolve the contradiction between 1, 
3 and 4 in favor of conclusion 5 rather than 5*.  Part of rhetorical adduction is making it so that 4 
is more plausible than 1 (7, 8, → 4).   
7) If Z, then policy p has property Y 
8) Z 
Here Z is some fact with an empirical referent, such as an action.  For intuitiveness, an everyday 
example might be a situation in which a faction in a university department wants to hire an inside 
candidate, but they are opposed by another department faction, on the basis that this would be 
illegitimate.  Possible arguments might be that this would be nepotism, or that they might not be 
the best candidate.  The first faction then argues that if they run a standard search, the result of 
that search would not be nepotism and would be the best of available candidates, and hence be 
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legitimate.  The department runs the search, and then selects the inside candidate.  The central 
administration then acquiesces to this decision.   
Applying the Model:  Indian Intervention in Pakistan and the Recognition of Bangladesh 
In order to demonstrate how the rhetorical adduction model explains behavior, I now apply the 
model to the peacemaking process at the end of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.  In particular, I 
use the model to explain both why India withdrew its troops from East Pakistan / Bangladesh so 
quickly after defeating West Pakistani forces, and why states that initially opposed India’s 
actions and the creation of a new state ended up recognizing Bangladesh.   
I argue that the recognition of the new state of Bangladesh was made possible by rhetorical 
adduction.  That is, an argument was made that the proposed withdrawal of Indian troops from 
Bangladesh meant that recognizing Bangladesh would not violate norms of non-aggression, self-
determination, or the international legal norm of effective control of territory.  Indian troops were 
withdrawn from Bangladesh to bolster these arguments.  Some states recognized Bangladesh 
because the Indian agreement to withdraw and then actual withdrawal of troops removed their 
objections to recognition.  By contrast, states were not predisposed to recognize Bangladesh 
because of the mass killing of Bengalis, nor were they simply applying the international law of 
sovereignty to the situation.  In addition, India did not withdraw troops because they experienced 
or anticipated high occupation costs.   
After laying out relevant historical context, I define observable implications before showing how 
the evidence is in favor of rhetorical adduction and not the alternative explanations.  I use theory-
26 
 
building process-tracing, in which I use evidence from a single case to infer the existence of an 
analytically general mechanism.64  The case thus constitutes a plausibility probe.   
Historical Context 
Three themes of the historical context were relevant to the argumentation over recognition.65  
First, was the putative Bangladeshi state a result of self-determination?  Second, what was the 
attitude of the international community to India’s use of force?  And third, what was the attitude 
of decision-makers in other states towards a potential new state of Bangladesh?   
The feature most relevant to the question of self-determination for Bangladesh was the 
democratic elections held in Pakistan in December 1970, its first since independence from 
Britain and partition from India in 1947.  Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman's Bengali nationalist party, 
the Awami League, won an overall majority of seats in the parliament (including both East and 
West Pakistan).  However, the League was prevented from forming a Pakistani government by 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, which had won a majority of the seats 
from West Pakistan, and the previous leader, President General Yahya Khan.  A violent 
crackdown on Bengali political opposition by West Pakistani armed forces starting in March 
1971 left hundreds of thousands dead66 and included the incarceration of Sheikh Mujib.  This 
resulted in a massive outpouring of refugees across the border into Indian Bengal.  In April, the 
Awami League issued a declaration of independence that was initially ignored internationally.   
                                                     
64  Beach and Pedersen 2013. 
65  See Raghavan 2013 for the most recent and well documented study of the 1971 conflict.   
66  Fatality estimates vary widely.   
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India’s intervention into East Pakistan was widely criticized.  Soon after the violence began, the 
amount of refugees fleeing to India was being estimated to be in the millions and Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi decided on a military intervention into East Pakistan.67  In October, the Indian 
army began launching attacks and holding territory inside East Pakistan.68  India declared war on 
Pakistan on 3 December, citing self-defense against Pakistani air attacks.  However, India was 
widely treated as the initiator of cross-border violence.  Bhutto, the new President of West 
Pakistan, argued that a USSR-proposed Security Council resolution transferring sovereignty to 
Bangladesh meant legitimizing aggression: 
This is gunboat diplomacy in its worst form.  It makes the Hitlerite aggression pale into 
insignificance, because Hitlerite aggression was not accepted by the world.69 
Impose any decision, have a treaty worse than the Treaty of Versailles, legalize aggression, 
legalize occupation, legalize everything that has been illegal up to 15 December 1971.  I will 
not be a party to it.70 
Similar sentiments were expressed by some other states and the resolution was not adopted.  
Other UNSC resolutions that merely called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal to internationally 
recognized borders but that pointedly excluded the transferal of political authority to the Awami 
League and Bangladesh were vetoed by the USSR.  This stalemate in the Security Council led to 
                                                     
67  Kux 1993, 290 
68  Sisson and Rose 1990, 213 
69 S/PV. 1614, 74.  
70 S/PV. 1614, 84. Bhutto made this same argument in private, bilateral exchanges, for example with UK Prime 
Minister Edward Heath, “...this will be the first instance of Britain accepting and endorsing the dismemberment of a 
Commonwealth country achieved through aggression. … The intended recognition of “Bangladesh” by Britain 
would … put a seal of respectability to an aggression against a Commonwealth country and set a dangerous 
precedent for the future”  (letter 19 January 1972, PREM 15/751  Premier’s Archives, (PREM).  Referenced with the 
piece reference.).   
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the transfer of the issue to the General Assembly and subsequently the near-unanimous (104 to 
11 with 10 abstentions) General Assembly resolution 2793, which duplicated the resolutions 
vetoed by the USSR.  Indian military success continued as the USSR vetoed another UNSC 
resolution on 13 December and the next day, Pakistani forces in East Pakistan proposed a cease-
fire, which India accepted.  However, after the end of hostilities, India’s victory was not 
immediately accepted and normalized by those states who had been so vociferously denouncing 
the invasion only days before.  As Henry Kissinger said to US President Richard Nixon, “The 
Indians are demanding the UN agree for the turnover of authority to the Bangla Desh. Now that 
would make the UN an active participant in aggression. I don’t think we can agree to this.”71  
Before and during the war between India and Pakistan, no states had a clear preference for the 
existence of a new “Bangla Desh” state (apart from the belligerents).  Based on Indian 
governmental and personal papers, Bass recounts the efforts of Gandhi, P. N. Haksar, Principal 
Secretary to the President, and Indian diplomats in a global appeal for help.  Initially appealing to 
sixty-one countries, the Indians tried to publicize what they called the genocide against the 
Bengalis.  External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh personally visited numerous foreign capitals 
in June 1971, Education Minister Siddhartha Shankar Ray toured Asia, and Home Affairs 
Minister K. C. Pant traveled around Latin America, all asking for help with the refugee problem 
and specifically asking for recognition of Bangla Desh.  No states agreed to recognize, and only 
a few even made public statements of sympathy or support.  Bass describes the whole enterprise 
as “crushingly disappointing”.72  Even the Soviet Union, publicly supportive of both India and 
                                                     
71 FRUS 1969-1976 XI: 315.  Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Referenced with the year and volume 
number, followed by the document number. 
72 Bass 2013, 136-141.   
29 
 
Bangladesh throughout the crisis, resisted.  Alexei Kosygin, Soviet Premier, privately urged D. P. 
Dhar, Indian Ambassador to Moscow, to avoid war with Pakistan, and subsequently told Singh 
not to recognize Bangladesh.73  What this indicates is that most states were against recognition 
before the war, or at the very least were unclear about whether they wanted to recognize 
Bangladesh.  In a memorable episode, Mexico’s president had so little idea about the situation 
that he refused to believe that West and East Pakistan were so far apart until an atlas was fetched, 
at which point he said, “By God, it’s really so”. 74   
Apart from India and Bhutan, no states recognized Bangladesh before 11 January 1972, even 
after the end of hostilities on 14 December.  Between 11 January and 14 February 1972, 36 states 
recognized Bangladesh, including the UK and 9 others on 4 February (See Figure 2).  The US 
did not recognize Bangladesh until 4 April.  Bangladesh applied for UN membership later that 
year, but a UNSC resolution admitting the new state was vetoed by China in August.  
Bangladesh was not admitted to the UN until 1974.   
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The Role of Troop Withdrawal 
After Sheikh Mujib was released from captivity in West Pakistan, he travelled to London where, 
in a meeting on 8 January 1972, the British government impressed upon him the importance of 
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Indian troop withdrawal for the recognition of Bangladesh.75  However, the connection between 
these two things was not immediately apparent.  For example, UK Ambassador to Turkey 
Roderick Sarell reported that the senior members of the Turkish foreign policy establishment had 
agreed to not recognize Bangladesh only after the Indian troop presence in Bangladesh was 
presented to them as an issue and a barrier to recognition.76  Similarly, the Sri Lankan 
(Ceylonese) government asked “Whether Mujib has stated publicly that Mrs Gandhi has agreed 
to withdraw Indian forces on his request”, but only after having it explained to them that 
withdrawal was relevant to recognition.77  Mujib and members of the Indian government insisted 
that Indian troops were only in Bangladesh at the request of the Bangladeshi administration and 
Gandhi and Mujib jointly declared on 8 February 1972 that India would withdraw all its troops 
from Bangladesh by 25 March.78  Mujib in fact declared that all troops were withdrawn on 13 
March.79   
There were three arguments to which Indian troop withdrawal was crucially linked.  First, 
withdrawal meant that the Indian military intervention did not count as aggression, or was an 
excused exception to the general rule, so recognizing the fruits of that intervention did not count 
as legitimizing aggression.  This might sound counterintuitive; an aggression is not undone if the 
perpetrator withdraws afterwards.80  However, the case was made that a key characteristic of 
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reference. 
77 Cable from Mackintosh 25 January 1972, FCO 37/1020 
78  New York Times, 9 February 1972, 9.   
79  New York Times, 13 March 1972, 7. 
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aggression or a war of conquest was the desire to annex or occupy territory, and withdrawal 
indicated that India had no desire to do so.  So, the invasion was in effect recast as an excused 
exception to the rule against the use of force.  Analogously, whether taking an object counts as 
theft or borrowing depends on whether it is given back.  Second, withdrawal was also claimed to 
mean that the creation of the state of Bangladesh was an act of self-determination.  Third, and 
finally, the conventional international legal criteria for recognition included “effective control of 
territory” and so recognition was not impeded by being illegal.  There was no question that 
Indian troops had crossed the border into East Pakistan.  The issue to be resolved was whether 
this counted as aggression, or whether the presence of Indian troops meant that the nascent 
Bangladesh government did not enjoy popular support.   
So, in terms of the rhetorical adduction model (see Figure 3), the policy at stake is the 
recognition of Bangladesh.  The claimant is the Mujib administration, India, and other states like 
the UK who want Bangladesh to be recognized.  The opposition are Bhutto and the West 
Pakistan leadership, as well as China.  The opposition charge that recognition is illegitimate 
because it has the following properties: a) it would mean approving of aggression; b) the Mujib 
government does not enjoy popular support; and c) the Mujib government does not and cannot 
control the territory of East Pakistan.  The claimant counterargument is that if India withdraws 
her troops, then recognition will no longer imply approval of aggression, and the Mujib 
government can be said to both enjoy popular support and control its territory.   
Note that I do not provide a complete account of the decisions to recognize Bangladesh, which 
were multifaceted.81  The relevant claim here is that there were potential objections or sources of 
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resistance to the recognition policy that were removed by rhetorical adduction.  In the 
Bangladesh case, the sole remaining objections were removed and so rhetorical adduction made 
the difference between policy adoption and non-adoption.  Two counterfactual scenarios are the 
following: 
Counterfactual: What if the UK, India, and others had not argued that withdrawal excused the 
Indian invasion and legitimated the Bangladesh state? 
Counterfactually, if the UK and others had not fixed upon Indian withdrawal of troops as an 
indicator of the legitimacy of the use of force by India, and of the Mujib regime, then there 
would have been no reason for India to withdraw troops.  Prior discussions between India and 
Bangladesh involved an Indian military presence (see below).   
Counterfactual: What if India had not withdrawn troops? 
In a counterfactual world where India did not withdraw troops, resistance to the recognition 
policy would have been higher and some states would not have recognized Bangladesh.   
Observable Implications 
The claim here is that the policy of recognizing Bangladesh was made possible by a combination 
of creative argumentation and the action of withdrawal of Indian troops.  So, recognition 
happened (at least for some states) because of the argumentation and withdrawal.  Also, 
withdrawal happened because of India’s and Bangladesh’s desire to legitimate recognition.  
What are the observable implications of these claims, given the theory outlined above?  First, we 
should see explicit linking of the action (i.e. withdrawal) with the policy (i.e. recognition).  
Actors might say something like, “We have to do this (the action) so that the others can / will do 
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that (the policy)”, or “We have done this (the action), so now you can / must do that (the policy)”.  
Second, we should see the recognition decision happen after the action that was adduced.  Third, 
we should see explicit conditioning of the recognition decision on the action.   
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Claimant Linking Action to Policy 
After Mujib's meeting with Heath in London on 8 January, members of the UK government 
accepted that Indian troops were in Bangladesh with the agreement of the Bangladeshi 
government, and that they would be withdrawn.  From this meeting onward the British, the 
Indians, and the Mujib administration argued that the prospective withdrawal of Indian troops 
meant that recognition of Bangladesh was now an acceptable policy.   
By 18 January 1972, British diplomats were arguing to other governments that recognition could 
go ahead because “It seemed to us that the normal criteria for recognition were just about 
fulfilled and we did not regard the presence of Indian troops, particularly given what had been 
said in public by Sheikh Mujib about their status and their eventual withdrawal, as a serious 
obstacle”.82  In personal messages to state leaders, Heath argued that: 
whatever view is taken of the manner of its creation, a new national entity is coming into 
being whose Government appears to command the general acceptance of the majority of 
the people.  The maintenance of law and order is still, in the last resort, dependent upon 
the Indian Army, but their presence is accepted by the Government in Dacca and Mujib 
told me that, on his return, he would formally request the Army’s withdrawal in 
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accordance with a phased and agreed plan.83 
The reference to the manner of Bangladesh’s creation can only refer to the illegitimacy of India’s 
use of force.  In parliament sessions, at Foreign Ministry press conferences, and during Prime 
Minister’s question time throughout January and February, the standard answers provided to 
questions about the presence of Indian troops, or the status of Bangladesh, were that Indian 
troops were in Bangladesh “by the will” of the government, or “at the request” of Mujib.  
Conditioning of Policy Decision on Action  
Prior to the Mujib-Heath meeting on 8 January 1972, only 2 states, India and Bhutan, had 
recognized the state of Bangladesh, and no states had done so since the end of the fighting and 
the ceasefire declaration on 17 December 1971.84  What were the stated reasons why some states 
denied or delayed recognition of Bangladesh?85  There were four categories of reasons given to 
British officials on why recognition of Bangladesh might be a problem.  One was that 
recognition might negatively affect the state’s relations with Pakistan, and for some states, like 
Portugal and Hungary, this was their only stated concern.  However, many states conditioned 
their recognition decision on an action related to Indian troop withdrawal and gave three 
different types of reasons for doing so.  States also differed in the extent of troop withdrawal they 
required before recognition.  See Table 2 for a full list of states, their stated reason for 
                                                     
83 Initially the French President on 15 January 1972 (Letter from Heath to Pompidou, PREM 15/751) and eventually 
all other states (Douglas-Home telegram 21 January 1972, PREM 15/751). 
84 See Figure 2 
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conditioning recognition on withdrawal (if any can be identified), and what recognition was 
conditioned on (whether actual withdrawal or a proxy).   
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The first type of reason, opposition to condoning or legitimizing aggression, is labeled as “Non-
aggression”.  A good example comes from the Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Óscar Rabasa 
who reported that the Mexican president had decided not to recognize Bangladesh because, 
“Since the Mexicans, like many Latin Americans, refuse to condone territorial 
aggrandizement as a result of war, they would prefer to wait on the withdrawal of Indian 
troops as the sign of true independence.”86 
This statement also appeals to “true independence”.  Self-determination is another important 
value expressed by the Mexican representative and is the second type of reason commonly 
appealed to as justifying recognition as Bangladesh.  For example, Australia’s justification of its 
decision to recognize Bangladesh includes that “there was no doubt of the breadth and depth of 
the support which Sheikh Mujib’s Government enjoyed among the people of Bangla Desh.”87   
The third type of reason was whether the Mujib administration had control of the territory.  This 
was part of the often cited “international legal criteria” and played a central part in several states’ 
reasoning.  For example, Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, worried about 
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“the question that is concerning everyone, namely, is the govt that has been formed in 
Bangladesh really in authority and what is the effect of the presence of Indian troops.”88   
States also varied in what exactly they were conditioning their decision on.  Many recognition 
decisions came after actions that were effectively proxies for the withdrawal of Indian troops.  
While some states required actual verified withdrawal, others were willing to accept reassurances 
from the Bangladesh and Indian governments.  For the UK, Mujib’s assurance that Indian troops 
were in Bangladesh “at his behest and [that] the Indian Government has undertaken to withdraw 
them at his request”, was enough.89  Ever since Mujib’s meeting with UK Prime Minister Heath 
on 8 January, in which Mujib pledged to request the withdrawal of Indian troops as soon as 
possible, the UK government had been explicitly linking Mujib’s pledge with the recognition of 
Bangladesh.  Previously, UK representatives had focused on the actual presence of Indian troops 
as a barrier to UK recognition when communicating with other governments, such as Germany90 
and Vietnam91.  This was despite the fact that UK Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home had said, 
“The British interest lies in recognising Bangla Desh sooner rather than later.  Once we have 
recognised, we shall be in a better position to seek to influence the general policies of the new 
government and to protect British interests in the area”.  His reasoning was that it was “wrong to 
recognise for so long as the supreme authority in the territory of Bangla Desh is in practice 
exercised by the Indian Army commanders.”92  Once it was clear that “the Indian Army had 
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begun to leave; and those elements which remained did so at the request of [Mujib]”, Douglas-
Home informed the cabinet that the UK would recognize.93  India also repeatedly and publicly 
stated that its army would leave at the request of Mujib.94   
Countries, like the UK, who stated that they were conditioning recognition on Mujib’s agreeing 
that Indian troops were in the country with Mujib’s permission are marked “Agreement” in Table 
2.  States conditioning their decision on a formal announcement by India and Bangladesh that 
Indian troops would be withdrawn (with an official timetable) are marked “Statement”.  One 
example was Italy, whose minimal requirement was that there should be some public 
commitment to withdrawal.  Lo Prinzi (The Chief of the Asian Desk in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs), initially said that, “[i]t would be helpful if, in the meantime, Mujib could announce a 
timetable for withdrawal”.  Later he explicitly conditioned recognition on withdrawal: “Lo Prinzi 
said the Foreign Ministry were now thinking of recommending that an appeal be made to Mujib 
to announce at least a timetable for withdrawal.  If Mujib did this the Italians would have no 
difficulty in recognising earlier.”95  By 3 February, the Italians had decided to “put off” 
recognition without “some withdrawal or engagement to withdraw Indian troops”.96  In the end, 
the Italians, along with the French, did not formally recognize Bangladesh until 12 February 
1972, a few days after the joint Indian-Bangladeshi troop withdrawal declaration on 8 February.  
Similarly, the Secretary-General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it was 
“difficult for countries like Malaysia in absence of any move by Mujibur to make even a token 
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reduction in the large Indian forces in Bangla Desh, or any positive statement about their 
withdrawal by the Indian Government.”97  Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau asked Heath 
about withdrawal: 
“I wonder what the outcome has been of Mujib's intention, as described to you, that on 
his return to Dacca he would formally request the Indian Army's withdrawal in 
accordance with a phased and agreed plan.  I recall a joint statement of January 9, the day 
before he returned, that the Indian forces would be withdrawn at the request of the 
Government of Bangla Desh but there was no timetable mentioned.  If we and other 
countries could obtain firm information about such a plan, it would no doubt assist us in 
our evaluation of the situation.”98 
Canada did not recognize Bangladesh until 14 February, after the 8 February joint Indian-
Bangladesh declaration on troop withdrawal.   
Finally, some states required confirmation of the full withdrawal of Indian troops before 
recognizing.  These are marked “Withdrawal”.  The sentiment was concisely stated by a senior 
Nigerian diplomat who explained that even though Indian assurances of withdrawal were 
assuring, they were not as assuring as withdrawal itself.99  
The US’s decisionmaking process was complicated by Nixon’s secretly organized visit to China 
in early 1972.  The State Department had recommended that the US “position on recognition will 
depend inter alia on a commitment on withdrawal of Indian forces and the ability of the Bangla 
Desh government to assume the responsibilities and obligations of a sovereign and independent 
state.”100  Henry Kissinger also included as a reason for delaying recognition of Bangladesh that, 
“We did not want to move too quickly in blessing the fruits of India's action… In any case, 
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Indian troops are scheduled to be withdrawn by March 25.”101  Subsequently, at the explicit 
behest of the Chinese, 102 Nixon and Kissinger delayed recognition until 4th April, after Nixon 
had returned from China.   
Timing of Action and Policy 
In order for rhetorical adduction to be causally relevant to the policy at stake, the decision to 
support or adopt the policy should occur after the claimant has taken the action that legitimates 
the policy.  As noted, states had different three types of action that they held to be a requirement 
for recognition.  While not all states recognized Bangladesh after actual withdrawal had occurred, 
recognition decisions did follow the performance of the stated condition.  For example, UK 
recognition followed Mujib’s insistence that Indian troops were there with his agreement, Italian 
and Canadian recognition came after the joint declaration of a timetable for withdrawing troops, 
and Nigerian recognition followed the declaration of actual withdrawal.   
Alternative Explanations 
What are the alternative explanations for why there was initially such opposition to recognizing 
Bangladesh combined with subsequent widespread recognition?  One alternative explanation is 
that states were inclined to recognize Bangladeshi independence due to the nature of the post-
election pre-war violence in East Pakistan.  However, the evidence runs counter to this 
possibility.  The massacres by the West Pakistani forces (the case was made by the Indian 
parliament that this “amounts to genocide”103), were known about, being widely reported in the 
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mainstream press, like the New York Times and The Sunday Times.104  However, this violence 
was simply not mentioned as a convincing reason for India’s intervention.  In fact, despite being 
well aware of their existence, no UN organ, like the Security Council or even the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities or the Committee on 
Racial Discrimination, deliberately considered the massacres.105  Wheeler analyzes the rhetoric 
used during the war to justify and judge Indian intervention in the context of the massacres in 
East Pakistan being a “supreme humanitarian emergency”.  He finds that despite recourse by 
India to humanitarian claims to classify its use of force as an exception to the rules, the society of 
states “emphatically rejected [those claims] as a legitimate basis for the use of force”.  Instead, 
“the Indian action was widely viewed as a breach of the rules that jeopardized the pillars of 
interstate order”.106  Bass’s account of the telegram notifying the US government of the violence 
by the diplomat Archer Blood supports the claim that few held the violence a good reason for 
Indian intervention.  Despite India’s diplomatic efforts to rally support by citing the violence and 
the burden on India of the millions of refugees, other countries replied “with firm exhortations to 
avoid military confrontation with Pakistan”.107  Bass also argues that General Assembly 
resolution 2793 constituted a “worldwide repudiation of India’s case for liberating 
Bangladesh”.108  Debnath’s focused evaluation of the UK finds that despite some domestic 
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pressure, the British government actively rejected a classification of the violence as genocide and 
she concludes that reports of atrocities played no role in decisionmaking.109 
Another alternative proposition is that there was an established set of rules, international law, 
that meant that there was no real need for contestation or argumentation (or rhetorical adduction), 
and the recognition of Bangladesh was merely a quasi-bureaucratic, rubber-stamp process of 
assessing whether the situation fit the criteria.  Musson makes a related claim that, “The British 
decision to recognize Bangladesh in early 1972 rested almost entirely on the fulfillment of 
international criteria.”110  However, this possibility assumes a much deeper institutionalization of 
the norms governing secession and aggression than was the case.  By contrast, the existing 
international law on the issues of recognition, secession, and the use of force were not conducive 
to allowing Bangladesh to become a state.  According to Crawford, the general law is clear: 
unlawful use of force cannot create sovereignty, cannot make secession legal.111  Shaw notes that 
Bangladesh is the only exception to the empirical rule that non-colonial secessions contrary to 
the consent of the mother state do not exist.112  Effective control was at the time, and still is, a 
key principle in international law relevant to recognition of states and governments.  However, 
after World War II, there was a substantial shift in recognizing practice away from effective 
control and towards normative principles as legitimate reasons for recognition, primarily anti-
colonialism and self-determination.113  As Coggins finds, recognition of secessionist entities does 
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not in fact follow a narrow interpretation of the international law principle of effective control 
and instead seems to vary according to the preferences of great powers, including legitimizing 
the violation of the norm of territorial integrity.114   
The other action explained as being driven by rhetorical adduction is the adduced action, the 
withdrawal of troops.  One alternative argument is that prompt withdrawal was due to India 
facing the prospect of high occupation costs early on.  This is not plausible because the 
inhabitants of East Pakistan were not resisting the Indian forces and frequently welcomed Indian 
troops as saving them from the violence directed against them by the West Pakistani military.115  
Another alternative explanation is that Mujib wanted the troops to leave so that he would be less 
subject to pressure from the Indian government.  In fact, the Mujib administration originally 
requested an Indian military presence, and invited Indian troops back into the country soon after 
withdrawal to assist the fledgling regime.  Prior to Mujib’s 8 January meeting with Heath, the 
Bangladeshi government position was that Indian army troops were essential to their plans.  
During a 6 January 1972 meeting between Indian government leaders, including Indira Gandhi 
and the Indian Defense Minister, Jagjivan Ram, and the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Abdus 
Samad, there was discussion of security issues.  Ram “conveyed India’s desire to recall Indian 
forces from Bangla Desh as soon as possible”.  Samad resisted, emphasizing that “certain 
essential tasks still remain to be performed [by the] Indian Army”.  Samad then requested and 
was granted “full assistance in training of officers and men of Bangla Desh forces”.116   
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The alternative explanations are not supported by the evidence and the rhetorical adduction 
model provides the best explanation of the move to recognition of Bangladesh.  For many states, 
despite their initial objections, recognition of the new nation of Bangladesh was made acceptable 
by the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh.  Britain, India, and Bangladesh argued 
successfully that withdrawal meant that recognition would not violate norms of non-aggression, 
self-determination, or the international legal norm of effective control of territory.  So, both the 
withdrawal and many recognition decisions were driven by rhetorical adduction.   
Conclusion 
The rhetorical adduction model is applicable to a relatively specific set of conditions that come 
together to produce a particular process of argument, counterargument, adduced action, and 
policy adoption.  If rhetorical adduction can bolster normative arguments, we should be 
interested in the conditions under which it works.  What are some possible sources of variation in 
the operation of this mechanism?   
A useful comparison to success in the Bangladesh case can be made with another set of 
arguments concerning the nonrecognition of Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 
2014.  The Crimean case is a useful comparison because it too involved arguments over 
territorial integrity, secession, and self-determination, as well as appeals to the international 
community for recognition.  The question is why the primary argument deployed by Russia and 
Crimean separatists, that a referendum on the secession proved that it constituted self-
determination, failed to gain any traction, even among relatively disinterested parties.  As 
outlined above, a crucial element of rhetorical adduction is that, in order to be convincing, the 
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actions taken to support the argument must be a competent performance, i.e. in accordance with 
the intersubjectively-accepted conception of the action.   
The attempt to support the argument that the Crimean secession and annexation was an act of 
self-determination by holding a referendum was clearly incompetent.  This is despite the fact that 
many of the inhabitants of Crimea are Russian speakers, Crimea was a sovereign state in 1917, 
an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from 1921-1945, part of Russia from 1945-1954, and 
was an autonomous Republic within Ukraine from 1992.117  There was a potentially convincing 
argument to be made that transferal of Crimea from Ukraine to Russia was an act of self-
determination.  The Supreme Council of Crimea issued a declaration of independence on 11 
March 2014 and subsequently held a referendum on whether Crimea should become part of 
Russia.118  Various Russian leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin during a 
telephone call to US President Barack Obama, asserted that the referendum was “legal and 
should be accepted”.119  The day after the referendum, Putin signed an Executive Order using the 
referendum as the sole justification for recognizing the Republic of Crimea.120  However, there 
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were numerous objections to the referendum.  Some of the most prominent concerned the form 
of the referendum (the questions, the timing, and its status under municipal law), the lack of 
independent election observers, the fact that intimidation and coercion were suspected due to the 
presence of armed Russian or pro-Russian forces, and doubts over the results.121  Numerous 
states and IOs claimed that the lack of “validity” of the referendum supported their argument 
against recognition, including in a UNSC draft resolution vetoed by Russia (S/2014/189), as well 
as the General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine.122   
We can explain the failure of argumentation to change the normative status of the annexation of 
Crimea via the incompetent performance of the primary action taken as part of rhetorical 
adduction.  An implication of this claim is that had the Crimean separatists conformed the 
referendum more closely to the intersubjective definition of a free and fair election, it would 
have been more convincing to the audience and much harder to dismiss by those implacably 
opposed to Russia’s actions.   
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More speculatively, we can draw out several features of the situation that affect whether the full 
process of rhetorical adduction plays out.  Only if the audience is valuable to the claimant and 
opposition is it worth trying to win their support.  Only if the audience is relevant to the success 
of the policy will winning them over have any effect on whether the policy gets adopted.  So, a 
source of variation is the value of the audience to the policy.  The audience may vary in terms of 
how susceptible they are to a reframing of the situation.  The more a situation is new or 
unprecedented, the more important rhetorical action is in constructing the properties of that 
situation, and hence the more consequential rhetorical adduction will be in bolstering the 
acceptability of a particular construction.  Maybe there are principles at stake in the contestation.  
That is, some situations bear on questions that are relatively unsettled in society, where the 
norms and rhetorical commonplaces are relatively less taken-for-granted and hence more up-for-
grabs.  Another vital source of variation is the ability of the arguer and counterarguer to come up 
with socially sustainable arguments and counterarguments within the constraints of the 
intersubjective stock of background knowledge and rhetorical commonplaces.  We as scholars 
may be able to spend large amounts of time and effort coming up with plausible frames of 
situations, but even so the ingenuity of political actors in trying to construe events and ideas to 
their advantage is constantly surprising.  The character and skill of individual people is another 
source of variation in the potential for rhetorical adduction both to be attempted and to be 
successful or otherwise.   
This article proposes a specific type of mechanism via which normative argumentation can have 
a causal impact on important actions in international politics.  In doing so, it both adds to those 
already identified, e.g. persuasion, rhetorical entrapment, and rhetorical coercion, and also 
provides avenues for further exploration of how rhetoric and argumentation shape the actions of 
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states.  By linking reason-based choice theory with argumentation theory, the article provides an 
enriched framework for understanding what effects argumentation can have and how it has them.  
Thus it both avoids obscuring argumentation’s impact by limiting it to those rare situations of 
power- and interest-free truth-seeking, and also allows for the detailed specification of other 
types of effects.  This paper uses the idea of changing an action’s normative status, such as 
redefinition as an excused exception to a norm, but there are plausibly many other ways of 
influencing the reasons for or against an action.  There is much room for further research on this 
topic.   
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